

2 DEC 1970

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

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2 DECEMBER 1970  
(VOL. XXI, NO. 48)

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FBIS TRENDS

2 DECEMBER 1970

## CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . i

### INDOCHINA

U.S. Mission to Rescue POW's in DRV Noted Belatedly, Obfuscated . 1  
 Hanoi Propaganda Calls for Vigilance, Combat-Readiness . . . . . 4  
 U.S. "Protective Reaction" Denounced; "Understanding" Denied . . 7  
 Air Strike Casualties Detailed; DMZ Bombings Protested . . . . . 7  
 PRC Scores Laird "Threat" to Bomb DRV, Reports on Paris Talks . . 9  
 Brezhnev Decries "Raids"; Comment Notes Commando Operations . . . 9  
 USSR, DRV Publicize Stockholm World Conference on Indochina . . . 12  
 VC Announces Holiday Truces, Assails Allied Stand on Cease-Fire . 13  
 Laos: NLHS Proposes Limited Bombing Halt for Meeting . . . . . 14

### PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS

Diplomatic Relations Established Between PRC, Ethiopia . . . . . 16  
 Peking Reformulates Doctrine of Peaceful Coexistence . . . . . 16

### BERLIN

Brezhnev in Yerevan Discusses FRG-USSR Treaty, Berlin Issue . . . 19  
 USSR, GDR Protest Holding of CDU/CSU Meeting in West Berlin . . . 20

### EUROPEAN SECURITY

Moscow Welcomes Finnish Proposal on Preconference Meetings . . . 22

### HUNGARIAN PARTY CONGRESS

"Marxist-Leninist" Course Stressed at Congress Windup . . . . . 23

### YUGOSLAVIA-BULGARIA

Belgrade Sees Shift in Sofia's Stand on Macedonian Issue . . . . 26  
 Tito Calls for Unity Against Foreign and Domestic Enemies . . . . 28

### USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Voronov Challenges Programs Advocated by Polyanskiy . . . . . 30

### PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Army's Leading Role in Party Rebuilding Emphasized . . . . . 34

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FBIS TRENDS

2 DECEMBER 1970

- 1 -

## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 23 - 29 NOVEMBER 1970

Moscow (3632 items)

Hungarian Party Congress	(2%)	11%
Indochina [Air Raids on North Vietnam]	(6%)	11%
Armenian SSR 50th Anniversary	(--)	7%
Luna 17 and Lunokhod	(20%)	6%
Czechoslovak President Svoboda's 75th Birthday	(--)	6%
China	(4%)	5%
Engels' 150th Birth Anniversary	(1%)	5%
Invasion of Guinea	(--)	4%
Middle East	(3%)	2%
Yugoslav National Day	(--)	2%
Suslov Speech to Rural Soviets	(--)	1%

Peking (3438 items)

Indochina [Air Raids on North Vietnam]	(25%)	25%
[Penn Nouth in DRV]	(11%)	17%
[Sihanouk in PRC]	(--)	3%
Invasion of Guinea	(10%)	2%
Albania	(--)	21%
[National Day]	(1%)	14%
[Sino-Albanian Diplomatic Relations Anniversary]	(--)	8%
Domestic Issues	(--)	4%
Romanian Government	(28%)	13%
Delegation in PRC	(3%)	6%
Mauritania National Day	(--)	5%
Yugoslav National Day	(--)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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- 1 -

## INDOCHINA

DRV media belatedly on 26 November first explicitly mentioned Secretary Laird's revelation, in his press conference on the 23d, concerning the U.S. operation aimed at rescuing prisoners thought to be at a camp some 20 miles from the North Vietnamese capital. The propaganda is marked by obfuscation, however, and the closest it comes to acknowledging details about the conduct of the operation is in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN's statement on the 26th that Nixon "played the farce of rescuing POWs" to carry out "sabotage acts against North Vietnam, which ranged from air raids to commando harassment in areas from the panhandle deep into the heartland." Doubt is also cast on U.S. statements about the rescue mission in a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 27th which says the story about the rescue was an attempt to justify the U.S. "war acts" in the face of public indignation and calls it undeniable evidence that attacks had occurred above as well as below the 19th parallel.

Calls for vigilance and combat preparedness are prominent in current propaganda, and the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 27th warns that the United States "will continue to step up sabotaging activities in brazen, reckless, and shrewd forms."

The first mention of the bombings of the DRV by a Soviet leader came from Brezhnev in Yerevan on 29 November when he said that the "provocative raids" on "populated localities" in the DRV and "impudent attempts" by Washington to justify them show continued U.S. aggressiveness. Brezhnev did not mention the operation to rescue captured pilots, but routine-level Moscow press and radio comment continues to denounce the "landing" of U.S. airborne units as well as the air strikes.

PRC media publicized the text of the 27 November DRV Foreign Ministry statement but have not otherwise acknowledged the U.S. announcement of the prisoner rescue attempt. The U.S. air attacks on the DRV continue to be scored, and Secretary Laird's remarks on the possibility of renewed bombing of the North draw criticism in a 28 November Li Hsien-nien speech at a Mauritanian embassy reception and in an NCNA commentary on the 29th which says Laird has been struck by a "fit of war madness."

### U.S. MISSION TO RESCUE POW'S IN DRV NOTED BELATEDLY, OBFUSCATED

Secretary Laird's 23 November press conference was first mentioned by DRV media in a NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 25th which obscured his disclosure of the prisoner-rescue operation, saying

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

only that he "admitted that on Nixon's orders the United States attacked a detention camp for air pirates at Son Tay, but the operation failed." DRV media on the 26th came closer to acknowledging the substance of Laird's remarks when Hanoi radio as well as VNA carried a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article and a statement attributed to the DRV delegation in Paris: Both say Laird contradicted earlier Administration insistence that U.S. attacks had been only below the 19th parallel when he "admitted" that there was an "attack" designed to free American pilots detained in a camp 20 miles from Hanoi.

The Paris delegation statement says nothing else about the attempt to rescue prisoners, an avoidance made more apparent when it mentions Secretary Laird's appearance before Senate committees on the 24th but ignores the fact that the commando raid was a main issue in the exchange. Hanoi media, in carrying the statement on the 26th, said it was "released"--apparently in Paris--on the 25th.\* DRV media have not reported Nguyen Thanh Le's press conference in Paris on the 26th--a pattern consistent with Hanoi's general practice of ignoring the press briefings by the Vietnamese communist spokesmen after each session of the Paris talks. Judging by the "memorandum" on the press conference sent to Hanoi--as usual--in VNA's service channel from Paris, Le reviewed "details" of the air strikes but was not responsive to questions on the U.S. prisoner-rescue operation.\*\*

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article goes beyond the delegation statement when it mentions a U.S. "commando" raid and sets out to demonstrate that the U.S. announcement of an attempt to rescue prisoners is a fabrication. The paper claims that the Administration "cooked up the pretext" of freeing American

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\* The text of the statement was carried in VNA's Vietnamese-language service transmission from Paris to Hanoi at 1640 GMT on the 25th. See the TRENDS of 25 November 1970, page 4.

\*\* Le merely referred journalists to earlier Hanoi statements when he was asked such questions as: "Mr. Laird said that the United States had airdropped commandos into a camp for detention of U.S. pilots at Son Tay. Will you give your opinion on this?" and "will you tell us the number of casualties sustained when the two sides fought on the ground?"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

2 DECEMBER 1970

- 3 -

pilots to counter severe criticism of the new U.S. "extremely dangerous military adventure" from world and American public opinion, including a "great number" of congressmen. Declaring that President Nixon, like President Johnson before him, has never run short of "pretexts" for acts of war against the DRV, the article says that

now Nixon played the farce of rescuing prisoners of war with a view to carrying out acts of sabotage against North Vietnam, which ranged from air raids to commando harassment in areas from the panhandle deep into the heartland.\*

QUAN DOI NHAN DAN says the "so-called acts to rescue pilots" and the large-scale air raids on 21 November are serious acts of war decided on by the President himself and made public with "complete brazenness" by Secretary Laird. Declaring that these actions are apparently calculated U.S. strategy, the paper charges that pretexts have been found to launch such air strikes as those in early May this year and on 21 November along with "airlift raids, all for the purpose of sabotaging North Vietnam."

The DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 27th, in the vein of the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, casts doubt on the existence of the U.S. prisoner-rescue mission but does not mention a "commando raid." It says that "in the face of undeniable evidence and strong indignation of public opinion, the U.S. authorities have had to claim by way of justification that the U.S. war acts were intended to take away detained pilots." This "perfidious argument," it adds, can in no way conceal U.S. crimes against the DRV.

Insisting that the DRV has unswervingly carried out a humanitarian policy vis-a-vis the captured U.S. pilots and has taken measures to ensure their safety, the statement declares that the U.S. threat to strike and remove pilots from detention

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\* DRV propaganda occasionally refers to "enemy commando and spy groups," usually in the context of lauding North Vietnamese feats in countering their activities. As recently as 18 November, a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, pegged to Secretary Laird's statement on the downing of a U.S. reconnaissance plane on the 13th, said that since the 1968 bombing halt the DRV armed forces "have sunk commando boats, wiped out or captured many enemy commando and spy groups, and shot down 121 U.S. planes."

CONFIDENTIAL



- 4 -

camps shows how "adventurous and hysterical" the U.S. authorities are, and it warns that "the U.S. aggressors must bear full responsibility for their reckless acts." This passage from the statement is quoted in a 2 December VNA dispatch which reports remarks on the prisoner issue by Secretary Laird, at a news conference prior to his departure for the Brussels NATO meeting, and by Ambassador Bruce at his Paris press conference on the 1st. Citing AP, VNA reports that Laird said the United States will make every effort to free American prisoners of war in the DRV, including possible military action, and that when he was asked if this included action similar to the commando raid on a North Vietnam prison camp near Hanoi last week, he replied, "I would not rule out any action." VNA does not detail Ambassador Bruce's remarks, saying only that "he made similar saber-rattling statements." Like QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 26th, VNA says the "so-called prisoner issue" is reminiscent of the "fabricated Gulf of Tonkin incident" during the Johnson Administration. It concludes: "The Nixon Administration now hopes that by new adventures it can ram through its Vietnamization policy, thereby impressing on the Vietnamese side the American terms of negotiation."

FRONT Limited Liberation Front propaganda on U.S. actions  
COMMENT against the North is highlighted by an interview with NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho with an LPA correspondent, broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 28th, in which he notes that the U.S. "tortuous and deceitful arguments" included the contention that the raids were aimed at freeing POW's as well as at protecting the lives of American servicemen. Tho says the PRG's eight-point proposal of 17 September is the best way to solve the U.S. POW problem and restore peace.

Secretary Laird's statements about the prisoner-rescue operation is also ridiculed in Liberation Radio commentaries on the 27th and the 29th, the former describing the operation as "the sending of commandos to carry out destructive activities against the DRV."

#### HANOI PROPAGANDA CALLS FOR VIGILANCE, COMBAT-READINESS

Exhortations for vigilance are a staple of Hanoi propaganda, but there has been a notable flurry of such appeals in the wake of the 21 November U.S. attacks. A 27 November QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, broadcast by Hanoi radio, observes that the United States has "intensified its activities of sabotage of the North in a most brazen manner" and goes on to point out requirements

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

of the self-defense militia. The editorial says that "when the enemy resorts to a destructive scheme in a region," the self-defense militiamen--"whether or not they are numerous and whether or not they are supported by other forces"--must "firmly counterattack and destroy" the enemy. Calling for an improvement in training, tactics, and command, it says the militiamen should "attach particular significance to the technique of attacking enemy aircraft flying at low altitudes and enemy warships trying to enter our territorial waters, and to attacking enemy rangers landing on our territory by air or water . . . ." (A Hanoi radio broadcast on the 27th also brought up the subject of low-flying aircraft. It said that in Ha Tinh Province various localities "have built battle positions from which they shoot at enemy aircraft at low altitudes.")

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial further calls for the working out of practical combat plans and for proper maintenance of weapons and equipment. "Whether in day or night, wherever they go or whatever they do," it says, "the self-defense militiamen should carry their weapons along with them or should stack them in a convenient place so that they may get them immediately in case of need." Leadership and inspection are other tasks the editorial says must be improved. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN adds that along with the strengthening of combat groups, "it is necessary to improve the specialized groups" such as those in charge of traffic, first aid stations, and fire teams "so that they may cope with the damages caused by the enemy."

Hanoi radio also broadcast the NHAN DAN editorial of the 27th which similarly discusses the importance of building the self-defense militia forces and says "we are determined to make a strong bunker of every village, enterprise, farm, work site, and street and to turn our villages and mountains into deadly traps to annihilate the U.S. aggressors wherever they show up . . . ."

A radio commentary on the same day focuses on the self-defense and militia forces of Nghe An, Thanh Hoa, Hai Hung, and Quang Ninh provinces, which it says "are being given intensive training in combat techniques and tactics," and it stresses the importance of the border areas in Nghe An Province. The commentary says that all the villages have their own detailed combat plans and that the village militia and guerrilla forces, "being ready to fight infiltrating rangers and spies," are also prepared to fight encroaching enemy aircraft.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

Another broadcast on the 27th, discussing the efforts of the armed forces in Son La Province to improve combat techniques; similarly notes that "especially in the border areas and in other important areas, the air-defense units and self-defense militia forces have urgently reviewed and supplemented their combat plans and have organized drills" to insure readiness. It states that "efforts have been made to firmly improve forces by strengthening defense and patrols in order to insure that whenever the enemy comes he will be defeated on the spot."

One of the radio broadcasts notes the concern of cadres and higher-level authorities regarding the defense tasks. It says that cadres have discussed with militiamen "how to develop initiative, how to properly study the enemy flight maneuvers, and how to handle home-made weapons in the struggle against the enemy ranger boats." It adds that cadres "from the military zones of the provincial and district units have been sent to the regions to check the quality of the training and the preparations for combat and to correct the shortcomings in time. The martial way of life in a number of government agencies and factories has been quickly reinforced . . . . Cadres and workers bring weapons along with them to work so that they may intercept the enemy at any time."

In a similar vein, a 29 November Hanoi radio broadcast says that units in the 3d military zone of the DRV, following the 21 November "battles," have "gained timely experience and have disseminated and revised their combat methods." It adds that "various levels of party committees in localities have greatly concerned themselves with leading the antiaircraft task and with achieving combat readiness. The military zone headquarters has appointed many teams of cadres to inspect the localities and battlefields in order to assume combat leadership."

CIVIL DEFENSE      Two current Hanoi radio broadcasts contain references to civil defense--a subject not known to have been mentioned in monitored Hanoi propaganda since August 1969 and only rarely discussed even before the 1968 bombing halt. Neither of the current broadcasts mentions the recent air strikes. On the 27th, in the course of praising Nghe An Province for its production and defense efforts, Hanoi radio says that "air defense units are constantly ready to fight the enemy" and that "trenches and foxholes have been repaired." A broadcast on 1 December says civil defense activities "are being stepped up everywhere" in Ha Tinh Province. It claims that "thousands of shock teams" have been

CONFIDENTIAL

- 7 -

formed to "repair or dig trenches for cooperative members' families and in public places such as near warehouses, in open fields, and along communications roads and roads leading to rice fields." It notes that several areas have set up antiaircraft guard posts and air alert observation towers, and it adds that the province has "also organized thousands of medical aid teams for first aid in air defense, fire fighting or for defusing bombs . . . ."

### U.S. "PROTECTIVE REACTION" DENOUNCED; "UNDERSTANDING" DENIED

U.S. statements that DRV attacks on reconnaissance planes will continue to evoke "provocative reaction" are repeatedly countered with the argument that the 1968 bombing halt was unconditional and that there was "absolutely no understanding" between the DRV and the United States allowing reconnaissance flights. At the same time, Hanoi notes that Laird and other U.S. spokesmen are now saying that the right to "react" goes beyond protecting reconnaissance flights. Thus the Paris delegation statement publicized in Hanoi media on the 26th notes that Laird on 21 November said the "reaction missions" were aimed at protecting the lives of pilots carrying out reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam and those "associated with the interdiction of North Vietnamese military supplies moving toward South Vietnam." It also mentions that Pentagon spokesman Friedheim on the 23d said strikes against the North also "constituted an answer to the attacks sustained by U.S. aircraft in Laos."

The DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 27th cites U.S. statements that the air strikes are aimed at protecting the lives of pilots in missions related to interdiction of North Vietnamese military supplies to South Vietnam via southern Laos. And Secretary Laird's remark--on the 24th before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--that the bombing of all North Vietnam would be resumed in the event of "an important penetration" into South Vietnam through the DMZ is noted in the Paris delegation's statement as well as in a Hanoi radio commentary on the 27th.

### AIR STRIKE CASUALTIES DETAILED; DMZ BOMBINGS PROTESTED

Following earlier general claims of casualties, including fatalities, caused by U.S. bombings, specific data are released in VNA's 26 November report of a special DRV War Crimes communique said to have been issued the previous day. The report says that in Quang Binh Province 13 civilians were killed and 23 others

CONFIDENTIAL

- 8 -

wounded, "most of them while working in the ricefields." It charges that a restaurant was bombed in Ky Anh district, Ha Tinh, killing 28 persons and injuring eight, and that in Ha Tay Province a sanatorium was hit, killing six patients and wounding seven. Also in Ha Tay, according to the report, "a creche of a factory was burnt down by U.S. phosphorous bombs, the mother and one of her three children were killed, and the others were seriously wounded." It adds that a prisoner of war camp was hit in the Ha Tay Province, wounding a number of pilots.

While the DRV Foreign Ministry statement does not repeat the war crimes communique's statistics, it says that in Quang Binh and Ha Tinh provinces alone, U.S. aircraft attacked "no less than 67 civilian targets and dropped 800 demolition bombs and tends of thousands of steel-pellet bombs, killing or wounding 72 civilians."

At his press conference in Paris on 26 November, Nguyen Thanh Le similarly charged that 49 people were killed and 40 wounded by the bombings. The account of the press conference has appeared only in the VNA service channel from Paris to Hanoi on 27 November; it has not been disseminated in DRV propaganda media.

**DMZ STRIKES** On 30 November Hanoi publicized a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest charging the United States with air strikes on 28 and 29 November against two villages in the northern part of the DMZ. (U.S. statements said that an area in North Vietnam five and a half miles above the DMZ had been bombed.) The spokesman's statement says that on 28 and 29 November the United States "sent many flights of U.S. aircraft to drop a series of demolition and steel pellet bombs on Huong Lap village" and at the same time used U.S. artillery fire on Vinh Son village from south of the demilitarized zone. It says both villages are located in the northern part of the DMZ.

The spokesman charged that the "acts of war grossly violate" DRV sovereignty and security and represent "a brazen challenge" to public opinion, which is "severely condemning" the 21 November attacks against the DRV. Reverting to routine practice, the spokesman "sternly condemned" the acts and demanded an end to all U.S. encroachments against the DRV.

CONFIDENTIAL

## PRC SCORES LAIRD "THREAT" TO BOI DRV, REPORTS ON PARIS TALKS

The U.S. bombing raids against the DRV were cited by Chou En-lai, in an Albanian reception speech on 29 November, as an example of U.S. "imperialist" aggression; and Li Hsien-nien, at a Mauritanian embassy reception on the 28th, condemned the bombing as a "monstrous crime." Li went on to score Secretary Laird for coming out with "frantic threats of war against the Vietnamese people, declaring that full-scale bombing of the DRV would be resumed when necessary." "All this," Li charged, "shows that U.S. imperialism is extremely barbarous and shameless and that its past announcement about 'stopping the bombing' of North Vietnam 'entirely' and its professed desire to seek 'peace' in Indochina are all sheer lies." Earlier, NCNA's 26 November account of Laird's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the 24th had accused him of making "rabid war threats in a frenzy of despair."

A 29 November NCNA commentary, attributed to NCNA correspondent Ou Ping, denounces Laird's statement on the possible resumption of full-scale bombing and the U.S. policy of protective reaction and again rejects the idea that there is a tacit agreement allowing reconnaissance over the DRV.

**PARIS TALKS**      Remarking that Laird's "sudden fit of war mania was by no means accidental," the Ou Ping commentary adds that "the spokesman of the U.S. Defense Department said at a press conference on 23 November that Laird was 'disturbed' by the failure of progress in the Paris talks." This gratuitous reference to the talks is unusual but comes on the heels of an earlier break in Peking's standard practice of virtually ignoring the talks. On 26 November Peking publicized the DRV and PRG statements of the 23d announcing the postponement of the 93d session of the Paris talks. Typically in the past, Peking had not publicized pronouncements by the delegations in Paris and had not referred to the talks in comment; the talks had, however, been mentioned in Chinese accounts of some DRV statements--most recently in PRC publicity for the 21 and 27 November DRV Foreign Ministry statements which charged that the U.S. bombing raids threatened the work of the Paris conference.

## BREZHNEV DECRIES "RAIDS"; COMMENT NOTES COMMANDO OPERATIONS

The first mention of the bombings of the DRV by a Soviet leader comes in Brezhnev's Yerevan speech of 29 November; he had failed to mention the raids in his 24 November address at the Hungarian

CONFIDENTIAL

- 10 -

party congress. Saying now that "the aggressors have not ceased to be aggressors" and have "not become meek lambs and good fairies," he points to the "recent provocative raids" on "a number of populated localities" in the DRV and to "unprecedentedly impudent attempts by certain Washington politicians" to legalize such "banditry" and arrogate to the United States the right to do what it likes in the "territory and airspace" of other states. He does not explicitly mention the U.S. operation to rescue U.S. prisoners, however.

Brezhnev repeats the line that the way to end the war is to end U.S. intervention, withdraw all troops, and let the Vietnamese people decide their own affairs. These points, he says, are the "essence" of the PRG and DRV proposals, which the USSR "fully supports." He concludes by promising continued Soviet assistance and support, recalling the recently signed agreements on Soviet economic and military assistance to the DRV.

Routine-level Moscow press and radio comment continues to denounce U.S. "aggressive" actions in the pattern of earlier propaganda. Commentators again say that the actions are "a new dangerous escalation" of the war, that the bombing was a violation of a U.S. "commitment" to stop the raids, and that the DRV has denied the existence of any "tacit agreement" permitting continued reconnaissance flights. A RED STAR article by Aleksey Leontyev on 26 November, refuting "hypocritical" American arguments on the purpose of the raids, cites the New York TIMES in noting Administration efforts to justify the raid as a "special strategic reaction to the rapid buildup of the enemy's might on the majority of fronts in Indochina."

Commentators assert that the United States intends to continue the bombing, citing Secretary Laird's statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the 24th that the United States will continue to take protective measures when the need arises. On 30 November Moscow briefly reported that an American plane again bombed DRV territory, and a 1 December IZVESTIYA article calls the new raid evidence of premeditated U.S. attempts to "spread the flame of war still further north." IZVESTIYA goes on to note charges in the United States that "the Pentagon leadership" has taken the initiative in renewing the bombing, citing articles in the Washington POST on 30 November to the effect that neither the Congressional leadership nor top levels in the State Department were informed in advance or consulted about consequences of the action. IZVESTIYA also mentions Senator Fulbright's remark in a TV interview that the Pentagon is taking the "main role" in determining foreign policy.



- 11 -

COMMANDO Continued Moscow attention to the prisoner-rescue  
OPERATION operation includes a 25 November domestic service  
commentary which says the American public reaction  
to the air raids was so stormy that three days after the fact,  
Laird revealed the operation in an effort to counter criticism.  
The commentary says the disclosure of the operation, which the  
White House and Pentagon "would have tried to conceal from world  
public opinion under different circumstances," merely increased  
the "indignation and alarm" in the United States.

TASS on 26 November, reporting that on the previous day President  
Nixon personally decorated participants in the commando raid,  
commented that the "progressive American public" regarded the  
ceremony as an elevation of aggressive actions against sovereign  
states to the level of "U.S. state policy." TASS said President  
Nixon announced at the ceremony the intention to take "diplomatic  
and 'other measures' to 'free' American pilots," and it added  
that "observers" viewed these remarks as White House insistence  
on continuation of "military provocations against the DRV."

TASS on the 28th and IZVESTIYA on the 29th reported that  
Assistant Secretary of Defense Henkin at a press conference  
"admitted" that U.S. aircraft "bombed" an "area near Hanoi"  
during the raid to free captured pilots. The reports say Henkin  
asserted that "appropriate weapons" were used--"namely bombs,  
rockets, and machine-gun fire." TASS comments that the new  
facts expose Washington's attempt to picture the "barbarous  
attack" as an "operation to liberate American fliers."

Reporting Secretary Laird's 30 November press conference, TASS  
on 1 December said Laird "had to admit" that the commando raid  
was "supported by bombers" and that Shrike missiles were used.  
TASS said that the Administration at first tried to conceal the  
Air Force involvement and that Laird, having failed to mention  
it in his Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony on the  
24th, tried to justify the omission by saying the congressmen did  
not ask him about it. TASS did not report Laird's statement  
that he had in fact mentioned the air support in his closed  
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the  
morning of the 24th.

PARIS TALKS Soviet commentators continue to charge that the  
bombings are aimed at "disrupting" the Paris  
talks and that they show U.S. lack of interest in peace talks.  
An IZVESTIYA article and a foreign-language radio commentary  
on 26 November both cite the Washington POST as saying that

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

2 DECEMBER 1970

- 12 -

aggression against the DRV was organized to "force the DRV representatives to quit the Paris talks," the radio commentary adding that it was also designed to "justify the possibility of a wide invasion of American troops on the territory of the DRV."

A 24 November RED STAR article by Aleksey Leontyev quotes the New York TIMES as saying that the raids were more than a mere retaliatory measure for the firing on a reconnaissance plane and that President Nixon believes he can "undermine the morale of the North Vietnamese and force Hanoi to make concessions in Paris." Some commentators assert that the renewed air war means a return to a policy which, as President Johnson learned, is expensive and ineffective and offers no prospects for either a military victory or peace.

#### USSR, DRV PUBLICIZE STOCKHOLM WORLD CONFERENCE ON INDOCHINA

TASS has reported the proceedings of the Stockholm World Conference of Peace-Loving Forces on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, held 28-30 November and reportedly attended by representatives of more than 70 countries.\* TASS quotes speakers as denouncing the resumed U.S. bombings of the DRV and reports that on the 28th the delegates approved a "statement" condemning the bombing as a provocation "seriously threatening" the Paris conference and giving the U.S. Administration a pretext for "new measures of war." On the 30th TASS briefly reported that the conference adopted an "appeal" to the peoples of the world, stressing that the Vietnam war has reached "a point of extreme gravity" as a result of the resumption of the bombings and intensification of U.S. aggression against the Indochinese peoples. The conference also passed a "declaration" accusing the United States of "military crimes" against the Indochinese people, according to TASS.

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\* The Fifth International Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, held last March, was said to have been attended by representatives of some 50 countries. The International Commission to Investigate U.S. War Crimes, set up at that meeting, held its first meeting in Stockholm 22-25 October. See the TRENDS of 28 October, page 6, and 4 November, pages 8-9.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
2 DECEMBER 1970

- 13 -

A message from DRV Premier Pham Van Dong wishing the conference success was publicized by VNA on 27 November, and LPA on the 28th carried a message from PRG President Huynh Tan Phat. On the 29th, VNA publicized the text of a "resolution"--the document that TASS called a statement--adopted by the conference on the 28th, noting that it "voiced strong protest" against the "new U.S. acts of war against the DRV." VNA carried the conference declaration on 2 December.

### VC ANNOUNCES HOLIDAY TRUCES, ASSAILS ALLIED STAND ON CEASE-FIRE

A statement by the PRG and an order from the PLAF command on holiday cease-fires, both dated 1 December, were first monitored from Liberation Radio at 2300 GMT on 30 November--0600 on 1 December Hanoi time. They announce that the communist forces will cease military attacks for three days over Christmas, from zero hour Indochina (Hanoi) time on 24 December to zero hour on the 27th; for three days over the solar New Year, from zero hour on 31 December to zero hour on 3 January; and for four days over the lunar new year (Tet), from zero hour on 26 January to zero hour 30 January.\* As in past years, the PLAF order specifies that the allies will be allowed freedom to carry out holiday activities and to visit "liberated areas" during the truce periods as long as they do not travel in groups or carry weapons or intelligence devices. Allied violations of the cease-fires, the order warns, will be "punished appropriately."

The communists' intention to declare holiday cease-fires was mentioned as early as 24 November in a Liberation Radio commentary which attacked the call for a standstill cease-fire in President Nixon's 7 October five-point proposal. It also accused the President of "resorting to other sensational tricks" such as allegedly saying that there would be a unilateral cease-fire by the end of October and that he would propose a "prolonged cease-fire at Christmas." Rejecting these "tricks," the commentary went on to say that "as in previous years, this year the PRG will again order a cessation of military attacks" on the occasion of the holidays. The radio charged that the allies have often taken advantage of truces and added that therefore, "although it would like to prolong the length of the cease-fire period so that the U.S.-puppet and satellite troops can celebrate their festivities, the PRG cannot prolong the cessation of military attacks."

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\* In 1968 and 1969, similar announcements were broadcast on 5 December providing for three-day Christmas and New Year's truces; however, the Tet cease-fire was announced later--on 29 January 1969 and on 5 January 1970. All three truces were announced on 17 November in 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
2 DECEMBER 1970

- 14 -

Two other Liberation Radio commentaries on 24 November also dealt with the cease-fire issue, and it was raised in Front comment on the 27th, 28th, and 29th. An LPA item on the 27th specifically cited a 25 November statement by a White House spokesman in charging that the Administration is "giving currency to the rumor of a 'cease-fire' from Christmas Day to the lunar new year." Other comment, in rejecting a prolonged holiday cease-fire, more vaguely attributed such a scheme to both Washington and Saigon. A Hanoi commentary on the 30th scored the President's 7 October cease-fire proposal and reaffirmed support for the PRG position on the question, but it made no mention of the speculation about the holiday truces.

On 1 December, after the announcement of the holiday cease-fires, two more Liberation Radio commentaries discussed the cease-fire question. One of them, which also cites the statement of the White House spokesman on the 25th, declares that "our people categorically reject any forms of extended cease-fire proposed by Nixon." The commentary also says "it is necessary to point out" that the communist cease-fire decision "absolutely does not signify a solution to the Vietnam war, as the U.S.-puppet clique is maneuvering to say in slander, with a view to creating illusions among a number of our compatriots" and among the allied forces.

#### LAOS: NLHS PROPOSES LIMITED BOMBING HALT FOR MEETING

The NLHS on 26 November for the first time publicized a call for a bombing halt of only limited scope and duration to make possible a meeting of plenipotentiaries in Khang Khay. The proposal was included in a Pathet Lao radio report that day of a "communique" issued by the NLHS on a 24 November meeting between Prince Souvanna Phouma and Prince Souphanouvong's special envoy, Tiao Souk Vongsak.\*

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\* Souk returned to Vientiane on 7 November and met with Souvanna Phouma on the 16th. He had gone to Sam Neua on 28 September following a stay of some two months in Vientiane conducting contacts with Souvanna Phouma.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
2 DECEMBER 1970

- 15 -

The NLHS has previously been inconsistent in defining a relationship between a bombing halt and the meeting; propaganda since July has sometimes but not always demanded that a "complete and unconditional" halt to the bombing precede the meeting. Now the communique reports Souk's suggestion that to provide security for the meeting the United States, its Vientiane "puppets," and "other pro-U.S. forces" should "halt all air strikes and aerial movements" over Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua provinces for 10 days (a Pathet Lao news agency commentary and noncommunist reports say 15 days) before the Khang Khay meeting, during the meeting, and for 10 days after it. Ground security, Souk said, would be the responsibility of the "patriotic forces."

The communique says Souk also suggested that the "two princes' sides" should each consist of one plenipotentiary and one or two assistants. He once again denounced Souvanna Phouma's "former" insistence on sending a "government delegation."

Accusing Souvanna of continuing to try to delay the meeting, the communique complains that he "still persisted in his nonexistent old status of Prime Minister of the National Provisional Coalition Government" and repeated his "distorted and slanderous statements" regarding the presence of North Vietnamese troops in Laos, demanding their withdrawal "in an attempt to reject Prince Souphanouvong's proposal concerning the security necessary for the Khang Khay meeting." The communique concludes, however, with an expression of hope that Souvanna will respond to Souphanouvong's "reasonable proposals." It notes that discussions will continue.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 16 -

## PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS

### DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ESTABLISHED BETWEEN PRC, ETHIOPIA

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and Ethiopia announced on 1 December represents Peking's fourth new recognition agreement in seven weeks. Peking's new diplomatic partners fall into two categories: one comprising Western countries that are members of NATO (Canada and Italy), the other consisting of nonaligned African countries (Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia). The joint communiques involving countries in the same category follow similar patterns. Those establishing relations between the PRC and the nonaligned countries meet Peking's optimum terms, while the communiques with Canada and Italy make use of a compromise formula on the key question of Taiwan in which the Western country merely "takes note" of Peking's claim to Taiwan without endorsing it. The latter communiques also fall short of Peking's preferred terms in registering Canadian and Italian recognition of the PRC as "the sole legal government of China."

In the communiques with Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia the PRC is recognized as "the sole legal government representing the entire Chinese people." That this is Peking's preferred formulation is indicated in the 15 October PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial welcoming Canada's recognition. The editorial used this formulation in stating Peking's claim to Taiwan and denouncing U.S. efforts to promote "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" schemes.

The joint communiques with the two African countries enumerate the five principles of peaceful coexistence as the basis of their relations. The communiques with the two Western countries, however, list only three of the five principles, omitting "mutual nonaggression" and "peaceful coexistence" (the fifth in the conventional order).

### PEKING REFORMULATES DOCTRINE OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

Peking has made use of Yugoslav national day on 27 November both to advertise its improved relations with Belgrade and to introduce a new ideological formulation which provides a rationale for its markedly flexible approach to foreign affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

- 17 -

in the past year. The Yugoslav ambassador's reception in Peking was attended by PRC Vice Chairman Tung Pi-wu, who has been acting as chief of state, and by Li Hsien-nien and Kuo Mo-jo. Last year--at a time when Peking was playing up its militant affinities with the Albanians shortly after the opening of the Sino-Soviet talks--there was no mention of Yugoslav national day in Chinese media. In 1968 a terse NCNA dispatch reported that the Yugoslav charge d'affaires' reception was attended by unnamed officials of the PRC Foreign Ministry.

Speaking at the Yugoslav reception this year, PRC Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua declared that the five principles of peaceful coexistence underlie the improved PRC-Yugoslav relations and should apply to relations between "all countries, whether they have the same or different social systems." This formulation represents a departure from what had been the standard Chinese line distinguishing between relations among socialist countries and those involving countries having different social systems. Thus, authoritative statements of Chinese foreign policy, as in the CCP's 14 June 1963 "general line" and Lin Piao's April 1969 report to the CCP congress, called for relations of "friendship, mutual assistance, and cooperation" with socialist countries on the principle of "proletarian internationalism," and for peaceful coexistence on the basis of the five principles with countries of different social systems.

The new, expanded formulation recalls Peking's use of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence during the period of destalinization strains following the 1956 CPSU congress--a period when the Chinese were also taking a flexible approach, before their sharp turn toward a militant ideological line in 1957. At that time Peking urged (in a government statement on 1 November 1956 during the Hungarian crisis) that relations among socialist countries be based on the principles of peaceful coexistence.\*

The new formulation accords with Peking's trend away from an ideological, "Marxist-Leninist" definition of priorities and commitments in foreign affairs and toward a flexible search along state-to-state lines in pursuit of Chinese national

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\* Peking's use of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence in the Sino-Soviet context is discussed in the TRENDS of 12 November 1970, pages 24-25.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 18 -

interests. The significant use recently of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence--a doctrine that enjoyed its heyday during the "Bandung phase" of Chinese foreign policy in the mid-1950's--has included authoritative statements calling for relations of peaceful coexistence with the United States (previously considered "out of the question") and with the Soviet Union. In these cases Peking invoked the doctrine as a rationale for negotiations with countries which are ideologically defined as enemies.

Peking's joint editorial on New Year's Day 1970 declared that it "has long been our consistent policy to develop diplomatic relations with all countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence." This did not clearly indicate a new formulation of the doctrine, and the 15 October PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on PRC-Canadian diplomatic relations used it in the conventional sense in saying experience has shown that the five principles of peaceful coexistence are the correct basis for relations "among nations with different social systems." The Sino-Yugoslav relationship provided a natural context for redefining the doctrine so as to eliminate ideological complications arising from Peking's efforts to develop relations which previously may have been encumbered by ideological animosities. It had been Yugoslav "modern revisionism" that served as the principal scapegoat for Peking's hardline campaign in the late 1950's demanding communist orthodoxy and opposing detente, or peaceful coexistence.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FRIS TRENDS

2 DECEMBER 1970

- 19 -

## BERLIN

## BREZHNEV IN YEREVAN DISCUSSES FRG-USSR TREATY, BERLIN ISSUE

In the pattern of his major speeches over the past three months, Brezhnev in Yerevan on 29 November again touched on the FRG-Soviet treaty signed in August. But in a departure from these speeches in Alma-Ata, Baku, and Budapest, he also discussed the Berlin question. He observed that the settlement of "certain questions relating to West Berlin, the subject of the current talks between representatives of the four powers," are of importance for normalizing the situation in Europe. "We believe an improvement of the situation with regard to West Berlin is quite feasible," he said, adding that the only thing needed is for all sides concerned to display good will and "to work out decisions that will meet the wishes of the people of West Berlin and take into account the legitimate interests and sovereign rights of the GDR."

Brezhnev's remarks on Berlin are the first by an elite Soviet spokesman since Gromyko, in his 21 October UNGA address, called an agreement "possible" at the four-power talks if good will is shown by all. Moscow has given low-keyed propaganda attention to these talks. A TASS report, carried in PRAVDA on the 24th, noted briefly that the four ambassadors had met the preceding day and that the next meeting would be held on 10 December.

In his discussion of the FRG-Soviet treaty, preceding the remarks on Berlin, Brezhnev focused on the "active political struggle" in the FRG on the issue of ratification of the treaty, describing the antagonists as those "in West Germany and beyond its boundaries who realistically appraise the situation" and those who for decades "have been pushing the FRG onto a disastrous path of revanchism and militarism." He asserted that the Soviet position in this matter is clear, reaffirming that the USSR is for normal, good neighborly relations with West Germany, for closer economic and cultural ties, and for cooperation in strengthening European security and world peace.

CONFIDENTIAL



- 20 -

Despite his juxtaposition of the issues of a Berlin settlement and ratification of the FRG-Soviet treaty, Brezhnev did not mention the Brandt government's contention that ratification depends on progress on the Berlin question. Since the signing of the treaty on 12 August, Soviet propaganda has maintained a virtual silence on the idea of such a linkage. Atypically, one Radio Moscow commentary in German on 13 October suggested that attempts to link the two issues must be viewed as an effort to "dictate some preconditions to the Soviet Union, with the objective of frustrating by one stroke both the ratification of the Soviet-West German treaty and the possibility of an agreement on the West Berlin issue." The commentary did not cite the Brandt government as the force behind the concept of linkage.

#### USSR, GDR PROTEST HOLDING OF CDU/CSU MEETING IN WEST BERLIN

Brezhnev's remarks on the Berlin problem came on the second day of the East German authorities' slowdown of traffic in and out of West Berlin on the three autobahns and two days before his departure--along with Kosygin, Katushev, and Gromyko--for a meeting of party and government leaders of the Warsaw Pact states which opened in East Berlin on 2 December. The continuing traffic slowdown, presumably in retaliation for the 30 November - 1 December West Berlin meeting of the CDU/CSU Bundestag faction, has not been mentioned in monitored Soviet or GDR media.

The GDR Foreign Ministry on the 26th and the Soviet ambassador to the GDR the next day issued formal protests against the CDU/CSU gathering. In his representation to the Western Big Three ambassadors to the FRG, Ambassador Abrasimov said the "provocative" gathering was aimed "against the efforts to normalize the situation in West Berlin and around it." The East German protest called the meeting a violation of the status of West Berlin as an "independent political entity," a violation of the interests of the GDR and other socialist states, and "a direct affront to all forces seeking the successful outcome of the current four-power talks on West Berlin in the interest of European security." The TASS report on the GDR protest includes the reference to the four-power talks.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
2 DECEMBER 1970

- 21 -

A participant in the 29 November Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable concluded that the gathering "is one of many provocative acts carried out in the past and at present to complicate the West Berlin situation, to increase tension and complicate the progress of talks now taking place on the West Berlin question." A 30 November Radio Moscow talk for German listeners also noted the possible effect on the four-power talks, adding that the CDU/CSU is further "gambling with West Berlin to create difficulties for the ratification of the Soviet-West German treaty."

On the 30th, both the Moscow domestic service and ADN reported that the Western Big Three had responded to Abrasimov's protest. The Moscow report, citing "information available to TASS," said the answer is "unsatisfactory and confirms that the Western powers are taking under their protection those forces which would like to make further use of West Berlin as a source of tension in Europe."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

2 DECEMBER 1970

- 22 -

## EUROPEAN SECURITY

## MOSCOW WELCOMES FINNISH PROPOSAL ON PRECONFERENCE MEETING

Moscow propaganda welcomes the 25 November Finnish proposal that heads of missions "or other representatives" in Helsinki hold consultations both with the Finnish Foreign Ministry and at multilateral meetings on the organization of a conference on European security. TASS promptly reported the press conference at which Finnish Foreign Minister Karjalainen made public his government's memorandum advancing the proposal, noting that it was sent to the same governments which had received the May 1969 Finnish memorandum offering Helsinki as the site for a European security conference.\* TASS does not mention that the United States and Canada were among the recipients, but a Radio Moscow commentary mentioning the proposal, broadcast in foreign languages on the 27th, reaffirms Warsaw Pact support for the participation of both countries.

Brezhnev did not mention the Finnish memorandum in passing remarks on a European security conference in the course of his 29 November Yerevan speech. In language reminiscent of his 24 November Budapest speech, he said only that the Warsaw Pact proposal for a conference had been favorably received by a majority of European states and that the convening of such a conference is becoming increasingly urgent and topical. But in the domestic service commentators' roundtable show on the 29th, a panelist declared that there exists everything necessary to hold an all-European conference on security and cooperation and added that "in this connection one can note with satisfaction the new initiative of the Finnish Government." A PRAVDA article on the 30th, reviewed by TASS, stated that Helsinki's "new constructive step" has been the subject of comment throughout Europe and contrasted the reaction of "objective observers" with that of the London TIMES, which it said reflects the thinking of "overseas forces" bent on delaying a conference.

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\* The 1969 Finnish memorandum, made public at a press conference in Helsinki on 7 May, is discussed in the TRENDS of 14 May 1969, pages 18-19. Gromyko gave formal Soviet endorsement to the Finnish proposal in his 10 July 1969 Supreme Soviet speech and reaffirmed it in his UNGA address that year. Both Kosygin and Podgornyy are on record as supporting the proposal, but Brezhnev has not mentioned it in any public statement.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 23 -

## HUNGARIAN PARTY CONGRESS

### "MARXIST-LENINIST" COURSE STRESSED AT CONGRESS WINDUP

Addressing the final session of the 10th Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (MSZMP) Congress on 27 November, First Secretary Kadar generally reiterated his assurances at the opening session on the 23d that Hungary's moves toward "socialist democracy" involve no erosion of ideological orthodoxy. He emphasized his party's "Marxist-Leninist guideline" requiring "a strengthening of socialist awareness, a spirit of unselfishness, and a readiness to make sacrifices." His assurances of fealty to orthodox precepts and solid integration in the Soviet bloc are buttressed in the congress resolution, released by MTI on the same day.

The few changes in the leading party bodies, announced on the 28th, amount to a modest gesture toward party democracy: Three figures--Gyorgy Aczel, Valeria Benke, and Karoly Nemeth--were added to the MSZMP Politburo and one, Miklos Avari, to the Secretariat. No one was dropped. The slightly expanded Central Committee includes several new women members.

Kadar underscores his control over the Hungarian party's current course in noting at the outset that "not one" of the 56 MSZMP speakers in the four-day "debate" had "deviated on any essential issue from the party policy"; all 56 had "presented complete unanimity on the main issues." In expressing "gratitude" for the attendance and speeches of Brezhnev and other foreign party delegates, he promised in effect that his regime would do nothing contrary to the policy laid down in Moscow: "The international stand of our fraternal parties regarding our party's endeavors is quite indispensable and means vitally important support for our struggle." He added that in implementing the congress decisions, his party "must be internationally welded to the sister parties" in the socialist countries and to the other world communist parties.

In discussing the building of socialism on Marxist-Leninist lines, Kadar reiterated the principle--"which has stood the test of time"--whereby the MSZMP more than any other ruling communist party has welcomed the participation of nonparty people. This "policy of associations," he declared, must be pursued "so that the unity of communists and persons outside

CONFIDENTIAL

- 24 -

the party becomes even closer." The congress resolution in effect reassures Moscow that the policy of associations will not get out of hand by underscoring the communist party's leading role and the principle of "democratic centralism." Singling out one feature of the new party statutes, it cautions that lowering the age limit for admission to the party "does not mean lessening the requirements" for membership but is intended rather to "promote a faster growth of the ranks of the communist contingent in the youth vanguard."

Reflecting an evident effort to keep the trend toward cultural liberalism in Hungary within bounds, the resolution demands "socialist, party-minded public spirit" and strengthening of "the role of the forces of socialist realism in literary and artistic life, too," to counter "bourgeois decadence" and "cultural rubbish." With the Czechoslovak episode evidently in mind, it rejects the "so-called pluralization of Marxism, the need for different trends within Marxism," as well as dogmatism, "revisionist distortion, and all forms of nationalist vestiges and newly engendered nationalist phenomena." The MSZMP, it says, "identifies with and follows" the June 1969 Moscow international communist conference document's call for struggle against both "rightist and 'leftist' opportunist concepts deviating from Marxism and Leninism."

KOMOC SIN                    The 25 November speech by Zoltan Komocsin,  
SPEECH                    Politburo member and secretary in charge of  
                                 international party affairs, underscored Hungary's  
role as an integral part of the world socialist system and,  
more explicitly than any other congress speech, denounced  
alleged Western efforts to drive a wedge between Budapest and  
its communist allies. "Certain imperialist press organs,"  
Komocsin noted, like to attach such labels to Hungary's  
leadership as "'the most courageous reformers' in domestic  
policy and 'conservative to the extreme' in foreign policy."  
Stressing that his party is following "the Marxist-Leninist  
guideline" both domestically and internationally, he declared  
that "the touchstone of internationalism is the relationship  
with the Soviet Union and its communist party," and "only  
that which is good for our friends and allies can be good for  
us."

Recalling at length the MSZMP's key role in preparations for the June 1969 Moscow conference and promising continued participation in "multilateral" party gatherings in the future,

- 25 -

Komocsin stated that "there is no greater or more honorable task for our party" than to serve the aspirations of the Hungarian people "and at the same time of the international communist movement."

RELATIONS WITH PRC Komocsin revealed that the Chinese had been invited to the Hungarian congress but had declined to attend. Declaring that "the Chinese leadership is now prepared to undertake only the normalization of interstate relations but to refuse the restoration of party relations," he expressed regret that "they and the Albanian leaders have not accepted" invitations to the congress. Komocsin echoed remarks in Kadar's opening congress speech in observing, however, that "the change which has taken place in PRC foreign policy has given rise to hope" and that "opportunities are ripening for improving interstate relations between China and the other socialist countries." Komocsin said "we would like to go forward along the road initiated, and we want to normalize and develop" Sino-Hungarian state relations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PBIS TRENDS

2 DECEMBER 1970

- 26 -

## YUGOSLAVIA-BULGARIA

## BELGRADE SEES SHIFT IN SOFIA'S STAND ON MACEDONIAN ISSUE

A further deterioration in Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations following recent efforts to improve them is reflected in intensified Yugoslav polemics over the perennial Macedonian issue, featuring new charges by Radio Zagreb's leading political commentator that the Bulgarians are renewing their claims to Macedonia because they believe Yugoslavia will "disintegrate" as a result of its mounting economic and political problems.

Numerous articles in the Yugoslav press have reacted sharply to the reappearance in the Bulgarian press of historical articles depicting Macedonia as part of Bulgaria. Belgrade views such articles as part of a campaign by Sofia, with implied Soviet backing, to exploit Yugoslavia's present difficulties by playing on the nationality problem. Apprehension over "foreign" attempts to undermine the Yugoslav Federation were expressed at the highest level in a speech by President Tito in the Serbian town of Smederevo on 25 November, when he warned against attempts by "devils from abroad" who "are working to destroy Yugoslavia from within."

**SOFIA TALKS** Yugoslavia's intensified anti-Bulgarian polemics come against the background of a recent exchange of letters between Tito and Zhivkov in September and a meeting of high-level Bulgarian and Yugoslav delegations in Sofia on 9-10 November, apparently aimed at improving relations and at arranging a summit meeting between the two party leaders.\* The terse 10 November communique on the outcome of the talks, however, recording the fact that "the two sides set forth their stands," indicated that little or no progress was made in resolving the differences. Tito in effect confirmed the negative outcome in his foreign policy report to the Federal Assembly on 18 November, broadcast by Radio Belgrade. He noted an improvement in Yugoslavia's relations with its neighbors "with the exception of Bulgaria, with which, despite our efforts, regrettably no such progress has been achieved."

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\* See the TRENDS of 12 November 1970, page 36.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIU TRENDS  
2 DECEMBER 1970

- 27 -

Although Tito did not elaborate on present Bulgarian-Yugoslav differences or mention Macedonia, Executive Committee member Crvenkovski spelled out the key problem in a report on the Sofia talks at a Macedonian party plenum: As reported by Radio Belgrade on 23 November, he said: "The Yugoslav delegation's efforts did not lead to positive results because of renewed attempts by the Bulgarian Communist Party delegation to further intensify the Bulgarian aspirations toward Yugoslavia, expressed primarily in the further maintenance of the thesis of San Stefano, Bulgaria,\* a negation of the Macedonian nation and its history, and in failure to recognize the national rights of the Macedonians in Pirin, Macedonia in accordance with international democratic practice."

**YUGOSLAV PRESS COMMENTARIES** Yugoslav media reacted strongly to what Belgrade viewed as an "intensification" of Bulgarian propaganda claims on Macedonia. An editorial in the Belgrade weekly NIN on 20 November, entitled "Bulgarian Escalation," took the Bulgarian magazine VOENO-ISTORICHESKI SBORNIK to task for publishing a lengthy article claiming that the 1841 Nis uprising broke out in "the northwestern and western parts of Bulgaria." Characterizing this "so-called historiography" as a classic example of Bulgarian "nourishing of revanchist tendencies," NIN declined "to guess what may be behind this escalation" but added: "It is not impossible that it falls within some wrong assessments of the situation in Yugoslavia which are present elsewhere"--an apparent oblique allusion to Soviet backing.

On 25 November, a lengthy article published in both BORBA and NOVA MAKEDONIJA under the title "Ghosts of the Past" charged the present Bulgarian Government with "rehabilitating" claims of the previous regime on Macedonia and "adopting them as its own." Bulgaria, the article said, is "revising not only its attitude toward the Macedonian nation but toward the entire Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and aspires to a radical revision of the very foundation of Yugoslav-Bulgarian

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\* The treaty of San Stefano, concluded between Russia and Turkey in 1878, elevated Bulgaria to the status of an autonomous, tributary principality and provided that Russia would administer it for two years. Macedonia was among the territories assigned to Bulgaria.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
2 DECEMBER 1970

- 28 -

relations. BORBA warned that "no one should nourish any illusions about the attitude socialist Yugoslavia will adopt regarding such trends."

Summaries of the NIS and BORBA articles as well as of a similar article in POLITIKA were broadcast by Radio Belgrade in Russian to the USSR on the 23d and 24th. The radio quoted POLITIKA as warning that "the Bulgarian territorial claims against Yugoslavia represent a dangerous course in international relations."

COMMENTARY      Radio Zagreb's Sundic, in a commentary on the 27th,  
BY SUNDIC          addressed himself to the question "why, according  
                    to assessments made by the Yugoslav state and party  
leadership," relations between Belgrade and Sofia are "worse than  
ever." He reported that at the recent Sofia talks the Bulgarians  
"admitted that they are ready to guarantee Yugoslavia's territorial  
integrity, but they also say they are not certain if future  
generations will also be ready to do so." In other words,  
according to Sundic, "Sofia does not exclude the possibility  
of Macedonia being joined to Bulgaria by force." He added  
caustically that when one claims another's territory, it means  
he will strive "to realize those claims either on his own or  
with somebody else's help."

Elaborating on what is "behind the resuscitation of the vampire  
of Bulgarian revanchism," Sundic alleged that Sofia is hoping  
the Yugoslav Federation will "disintegrate" and afford "a  
unique opportunity for Bulgaria to profit." He added that  
"what worries us most is the conviction that Bulgaria has  
someone's support for her aspirations--that is, that she has  
been talked into this by others."

#### TITO CALLS FOR UNITY AGAINST FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC ENEMIES

President Tito, in a speech to steelworkers in Smederevo, Serbia  
on 25 November, made a strong defense of Yugoslavia's self-  
management system and warned against foreign attempts to  
undermine it and to disrupt inter-nationality and inter-  
republican relations. Although Tito's invoking of a foreign  
threat and calls for a renewal of "brotherhood and unity"  
seem contrived to gain support for his economic and political  
reforms, his repeated emphasis on Yugoslavia's foreign "enemies"  
appears to reflect some genuine concern. Without naming the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
2 DECEMBER 1970

- 29 -

foreign culprits, he said "there are ravens abroad who have their long necks and beaks aimed at Yugoslavia, wondering whether they might obtain some easy profits and whether this country is perhaps ripe for this."

In another portion of the speech, Tito returned to this theme in noting that it is because Yugoslavia has a great many friends that "all the devils from abroad are trying to do us harm." Our opponents, he added, "are working very skillfully to destroy us from within" and are "introducing confusion in our ranks by means of various agents." In still another passage he appeared to express some bitterness that there are opponents of Yugoslavia's self-management system in communist ranks: "Unfortunately, such people are found among those who together with us should feel glad about our successes, those who should be our greatest friends and who should help us to solve whatever difficulties we may have."

Tito implied that Yugoslavia's difficulties were being viewed more sympathetically in the West. Noting that his recent tour of West European capitals was related to Yugoslavia's economic and agricultural difficulties, he said that he was listened to "attentively" and that there was general agreement with his views. In a later speech at Kragujevac on the 27th, Tito reported that World Bank President Robert McNamara had expressed admiration for Yugoslavia's accomplishments during a recent visit to Belgrade.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
2 DECEMBER 1970

- 30 -

## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## VORONOV CHALLENGES PROGRAMS ADVOCATED BY POLYANSKIY

In a long, argumentative speech to a 24 November RSFSR conference of local soviet leaders, RSFSR Premier Voronov has implicitly challenged programs long advocated by agricultural spokesman Polyanskiy: the raising of prices for agricultural products, the increasing of allocations for agriculture in the new five-year plan, and the expensive rural construction program. Inasmuch as the Politburo decided to raise procurement prices and increase agricultural investment last spring, Voronov appears out of step with his colleagues.

While Voronov's opposition to Polyanskiy's ideas could be inferred earlier from his consistent silence, or different stress, on certain topics, his present statements are the most direct indications of his position to date. The differences between Polyanskiy and Voronov have long appeared to center mainly on finances, with Polyanskiy arguing that agricultural production can only be increased by investing vast new sums, and Voronov maintaining that improved efficiency is the key. Consistently ignoring Polyanskiy's appeals for increased investment, Voronov has repeatedly urged adoption of organizational measures and innovations, especially unregulated mechanized links and specialization of livestock raising. As RSFSR premier, Voronov has implemented his programs in the RSFSR, but USSR First Deputy Premier Polyanskiy has ignored them. The central agricultural agencies have followed Polyanskiy's lead in avoiding any endorsement of Voronov's programs.

OPPOSITION TO PRICE RISES      In his 24 November speech, (SOVIET RUSSIA, 25 November), Voronov questions the value of raising purchase prices for livestock products. He argues that some farms are using inefficient methods resulting in high and even rising costs, and until they change their methods "no raising of prices will help such farms turn livestock raising into a highly profitable branch." He declares that "the leaders of many farms correctly think that the only way to increase profitability of livestock raising" is by raising productivity, expanding production, and cutting costs.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
2 DECEMBER 1970

- 31 -

Voronov's remedy is more specialization in livestock raising, especially the wide introduction of meat cattle breeds and specialized meat cattle farms producing heavier cattle at less cost. In a recent--2 October--KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA interview, Voronov argued at length for his long-advocated meat cattle program.

The issue of higher prices for livestock products had become a subject of top-level discussion by late 1969 when the lag in meat production became alarming. The Estonian leaders--whose views have often paralleled Voronov's--openly attacked proposals for raising such prices. At the December 1969 USSR Supreme Soviet session, Estonian Premier V. I. Klauson complained that "instead of widely studying, generalizing, and introducing into livestock raising the advanced experience of farms and republics where the level of livestock development is higher, the raising of purchase prices is being proposed as one of the measures to raise the profitability of meat production. This path is hardly correct" (SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 20 December).

Nevertheless, in March the Politburo decreed higher prices for livestock products.\* Even after the decision the Estonians voiced discontent. Estonian First Deputy Premier E. Tynurist complained in the 10 April IZVESTIYA that "recently instead of seriously studying zootechnical problems influencing the growth of production and profitability of livestock-raising branches, and generalizing and introducing advanced technology," the USSR Agriculture Ministry "is trying to reduce everything to a review of purchase prices and an increase in capital investments on construction of large [livestock] complexes."

Voronov hinted at his displeasure with the price rise decision by ignoring it in his discussion of livestock in his lengthy speech in late March (LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, 24 March). He attributed the general agricultural lag to poor agrotechnique, poor application of scientific achievement, and poor organization of labor and wages. He repeated this line in his 8 June Supreme Soviet election speech, stressing reduction of costs, improvement of organization, and introduction of unregulated mechanized links (PRAVDA, 9 June).

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\* See Brezhnev's 2 July plenum report. The decree itself was published in the 18 July PRAVDA.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
2 DECEMBER 1970

- 32 -

**FIVE YEAR PLAN** In his 24 November speech Voronov also appears to diverge on future resource allocations. During the debate over the draft five-year plan this spring, Polyanskiy argued for an increase in allocations for agriculture (in the April SOVIETS OF WORKERS DEPUTIES). With Brezhnev's backing, apparently, this appeal was successful, and the Politburo decided in May to increase agriculture allocations. Nevertheless, Voronov's 8 June election speech stressed the importance of consumer goods in the new plan, and he was one of the few Politburo members who failed to mention the decision to increase aid for agriculture. In his latest speech, continuing in the same vein, Voronov declares that "as before, industry will develop at high rates," and notes only that "a big program has been outlined for further raising of agricultural production." While he mentions the July plenum decision to increase delivery of agricultural equipment, he points to the existence of "enormous unused reserves," with many tractors utilized only for one shift and only on weekdays.

**RURAL CONSTRUCTION** Voronov also takes issue with the programs of rural construction advocated by Polyanskiy. Polyanskiy has long argued for large investments in agriculture to transform villages into urban-type settlements with better housing and cultural conditions conducive to preventing the exodus of youth from the countryside (in his 10 June 1967 speech, his October 1967 KOMMUNIST article, his April 1970 SOVIETS OF WORKERS DEPUTIES article, and his 3 June 1970 election speech). Voronov declares that "often the reason for the outflow of youth from some rural districts is attributed only to shortcomings in housing and cultural and living conditions. . . . But reducing the whole matter to these matters alone is hardly correct." He reports that the RSFSR state committee for use of labor resources, on examining this question, found that many youth cite shortcomings in labor and production organization, dissatisfaction with jobs, and lack of opportunity as reasons for leaving the farm. The link system favored by Voronov is often advanced as a means to hold youths on the farms by providing more incentives and greater opportunities for individual initiative.

In his latest speech, once again Voronov vigorously promotes the link idea--in contrast to the position of silence maintained by other Politburo members. He calls on local soviets to champion the spread of mechanized links even though "some may say" it is not their business to impose the link system on farm leaders. He cites approvingly the example of local soviets in Volgograd oblast which have succeeded in overcoming opposition to the innovation.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
2 DECEMBER 1970

- 33 -

VORONOV IN DISFAVOR      Voronov's polemical statements follow a long period of political eclipse and unexplained absence. On May Day he was ranked last among Politburo members. In June his long-time close ally and present top agricultural assistant, RSFSR First Deputy Premier Pysin, was not reelected to the Supreme Soviet--a possible sign of future demotion. Moreover on his birthday on 31 August, Voronov was conspicuously slighted: while other Politburo members (most recently Shelest on his 60th birthday in February 1968 and Pelshe on his 70th in February 1969) were each addressed as a "prominent leader of the Communist Party and Soviet government" and awarded the title Hero of Socialist Labor, a Hammer and Sickle medal, and an Order of Lenin on their birthdays, Voronov received no epithet and only an Order of Lenin (PRAVDA, 1 September)--as he had on his 50th birthday.

Voronov himself disappeared from view shortly before the snub on his birthday. After visiting a Hungarian exhibit on 21 August, he failed to represent the RSFSR at the Kazakh anniversary in late August or the Azerbaydzhan anniversary in late September; he did not attend the 6-7 November October Revolution ceremonies--which are rarely passed up by Soviet leaders. For three months, from 21 August to 21 November, he was identified only once in the press, when KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on 2 October reported his visit to a Moscow cattle-breeding exhibit and published a long interview with him in which he defended his meat cattle program. (He complained that the introduction of meat cattle breeding was being hampered by the "conservatism of certain leaders," and he managed to find a quotation from Lenin stressing the importance of meat cattle raising.) This absence was by far his longest in recent years.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
2 DECEMBER 1970

- 34 -

## PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## ARMY'S LEADING ROLE IN PARTY REBUILDING EMPHASIZED

Recent broadcasts by provincial radios have stepped up calls for the PLA to enhance its role in the 18-month-old campaign to rebuild the party as a disciplined organization. Reports of success in actually setting up new party committees remain few and far between, however--the most notable being a Chengchow radio account on 12 November of the establishment of 11 new county party committees in Honan province.

Conflict and tension clearly persist between the PLA's "support-the-left" personnel and those they are assigned to "support" in party reorganization efforts. A Taiyuan radio report on 25 November lauded the PLA unit of a special district in Shansi province for "placing themselves under the supervision of revolutionary committees at all levels," but it condemned "a number of PLA 'support-the-left' personnel" in one county who "became arrogant and complacent" and failed to understand the "complex nature of class struggle." Taiyuan radio claimed that the county "support-the-left" group is now holding study courses to eliminate feelings of arrogance among some "support-the-left" personnel.

Similar deficiencies within PLA units were decried in a 20 November Taiyuan broadcast. Reporting on a speech by a leading member of a local PLA unit at a recent Shansi provincial congress of activists, the radio quoted him as saying that "we are now in the position of holding power; we are the people who raise the banner and lead the way." The PLA representative cautioned, however, that if "PLA cadres participating in the three-way alliance" do not "get rid of the idealism and metaphysics in their minds" they will not be able to understand or carry out Mao's "revolutionary line."

Specific guidelines for "support-the-left" personnel to help them carry out their administrative duties were outlined in a Wuhan broadcast on 23 November. PLA representatives participating within party and revolutionary committees must study, live, and work with the civilian cadres, "and listen to their criticisms and proposals." During all PLA-led examinations of work programs, representatives of the cadres and the masses must be invited to be present so that "the PLA personnel can listen to their opinions and learn from them."

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
2 DECEMBER 1970

- 35 -

Yinchuan radio on 27 November explained in more detail than usual how one local "support-the-left" PLA unit responded successfully to the call of "our superior party organization and revolutionary committee" to rebuild the party structure in a Ningsia county. The PLA unit entered the county over one year ago, trained 2,500 activists in Mao's Thought, set up party core groups at all levels, and then guided the election and birth of the county's party committee last December. "Facts have proven," the broadcast instructed, that PLA units wishing to "support-the-left" in party building must first conduct ideological revolutionization "among the personnel carrying out the task."

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